Abstract: African regional organizations play a significant role in maintaining peace and security on their continent. This article looks at how China, as an emerging power in Africa, has incorporated these organizations into its policies on African security crises. It asserts that China has explicitly endorsed regional conflict resolution mechanisms, which it perceives as having a less intrusive impact on third world countries' sovereignty than have initiatives taken under the global collective security system led by the UN Security Council. Moreover, China strengthening cooperation with African regional organizations and aligning its stance with the views emerging from these regional bodies is an important way in which China has tried to respond to the rising security challenges and political demands it is faced with in Africa. The article briefly considers what influence China's increased attention to African regional bodies is having on efforts by Africa's traditional donors to help build -but also shape -Africa's emerging peace and security architecture.
Introduction
African regional and sub-regional organizations play an important role in maintaining peace and security on their continent. Since the 1990s, organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) (formerly the Organisation of African Unity, OAU) have intervened in various peace and security crises in their member states through mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement (see for instance Adetula 2008; Boulden 2003a; Moller 2009; Murithi 2008 ). This article looks at China's response to the African aspiration to find socalled "African solutions to African conflicts" and the ways in which China has incorporated African regional organizations into its policies regarding security challenges on the African continent. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China has an important and potentially decisive voice on African peace and security issues. Moreover, since the end of the 1990s Africa has quickly gained importance on China's foreign policy agenda. While the People's Republic of China has a decades-long history of engagement with Africa, the more ideological relations of the past have now been substituted for "a new type of strategic partnership", marked by vibrant economic cooperation (Wen 2009 ). China's openness to cooperation with all African countries, including some that are suffering from political instability or domestic conflict, has attracted particular attention. A key principle of China's foreign policy is a deep disinclination to get involved in the internal affairs of other states. China has thus been accused of embracing "pariah regimes" and has been faced with international calls to use its increasing influence and leverage with African governments to contribute more actively to resolving African security crises (Alden 2007: 59-66) . This article asserts that African regional bodies play a significant part in China's response to the demands and challenges it is faced with as an emerging economic and political power in Africa. Strengthening cooperation with African regional bodies and aligning its policies on particular conflicts with the consensus emerging from these regional organizations is an important way in which China has tried to respond to rising international expectations. Moreover, China has endorsed regional security cooperation to promote its views on acceptable methods of conflict resolution and the proper management of international affairs.
In the first section, the article 1 provides some historical background on regional conflict resolution in Africa and China's early response to the trend of advancing regional solutions to African conflict situations. This response was mainly informed by considerations of South-South solidarity and by a sense that regional conflict resolution mechanisms have a less intrusive impact on third world countries' sovereignty than those stemming from the global collective security system led by the UNSC. The second part of the article deals with some of the demands and reputational challenges that China is currently faced with as an emerging power in Africa. It looks at how supporting regional solutions at times provides a way for China to offset these challenges. Each part of the article briefly expands on how China's policies compare with those of Africa's traditional partners in the West. Since the mid-1990s, Western governments have generally become unwilling to deploy troops on longterm missions in Africa and have supported the trend of seeking to find "African solutions to African problems". Donors declared that bringing peace and stability to the African continent was primarily an African responsibility. They perceived their role in resolving African conflicts as confined to providing diplomatic, logistical and financial support to African regional organizations (Olsen 2009; Williams 2008: 310-312) . The article briefly considers what influence China's increased attention to African regional bodies is having on efforts by Africa's traditional donors to help build -but also shape -Africa's emerging peace and security architecture.
Historical Background on African Regional Security Cooperation and China's Position
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter establishes the possibility of cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations in order to safeguard international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, the topic has been a recurring theme in the workings and conceptual discussions of the UN. During the 1990s it became particularly relevant with regard to Africa. The continent had lost its strategic importance to the great powers as a battleground for influence. While this created room for the UN to become more involved in conflict reso-1 I wish to thank Gudrun Wacker, Jonathan Holslag and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. lution, the state-centric and sovereignty-based approach inherent in the UN Charter combined with the UN's overstretched resources rendered the organization ill-equipped to deal with the complex, mostly domestic conflicts that Africa was faced with. After the international community stood by as genocide unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 and the UN withdrew from Somalia in 1995, African elites came to see strengthening Africa's capacity to solve its own crises as a necessity. They turned to regional organizations to fill the gap left by the UN's retrenchment (Boulden 2003b: 12; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009 ).
Africa's first regional intervention in the post-Cold War era took place in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia to address the crisis that was growing there as a result of civil war and the collapse of the central government. Despite allegations of geopolitical machinations on the part of the interveners, excessive use of force, and human rights abuses, the enforcement operation was considered by many a model for Africa (Ero 2000) . China's initial official response to the new development of relying primarily on regional solutions in African peace and security crises reflected the support for African unity, independence and self-reliance that had been a consistent part of its Africa policy discourse since the Bandung Conference (Alden 2007: 32) . China called on the UN to heed the views of African countries and regional organizations on African issues and to give full play to these entities to settle conflicts in their own region by themselves (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000; PLA Daily 2003; United Nations 1995 , 1997a ; UN Doc. A/C.4/52/SR.14 16 February 1998). ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia did spark some discussions in Chinese academic circles about the legality and desirability of such a peace enforcement operation (Interview 1 2009). However, the initiative was generally perceived as having been borne out of necessity and reflecting a mentality change among Africans in favour of greater regional involvement in conflict resolution (Luo 2003; Xia 1993) . One Chinese analyst concluded that "relying on collective strength to solve domestic conflicts" was "the proper direction" for Africa to take (Xia 1993: 28) .
China not only supports a greater role for African regional organizations in conflict resolution, it also considers them well placed to make certain judgements on issues that impact the sovereignty and internal affairs of their members. In the words of one prominent Chinese Africa analyst:
China respects the AU's principles and the goal to end conflict on the continent, but views itself as having no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of African countries as an outsider.
[…] China does not consider itself qualified to make judgements on the domestic affairs of African countries and considers the AU more qualified to do so (Li 2007: 76) .
By the 1990s, Chinese analysts had already conceded that states could voluntarily relinquish part of their sovereignty to achieve certain longterm goals or political ideals (Chan 1999: 77) . China therefore has relatively little difficulty with African regional organizations engaging in conflict mediation and resolution if they have been given a mandate by their members to do so (Luo 2002: 30) . China particularly favours a greater role for regional organizations with regard to issues that potentially encroach on domestic affairs, such as early warning and international responses to domestic conflicts and humanitarian crises (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2005; United Nations 1995 Teitt 2008: 20) . On these issues, fears of the UN becoming an instrument for powerful countries to interfere in the affairs of the weak are particularly acute for China (United Nations 1995).
The views of African regional bodies have emerged as an important factor influencing China's position in the Security Council on African crises (International Crisis Group 2009: 23-25) . China is particularly likely to consider the views of key regional players when the Council is considering domestic crises in African countries or the imposition of Chapter VII measures, such as sanctions and the non-consensual use of force. When China is assured that a proposed measure is in keeping with the wishes of relevant regional organizations, it is more likely to be favourably disposed to it. In principle, China maintains that international measures invoking the use of force are only legitimate if the host nation's consent can be obtained. However, lacking such consent, the support of regional organizations emerges as a critical factor in swaying China to take a cooperative stance. According to one Western diplomat, an effective way of getting China on board when a Chapter VII resolution is tabled pertaining to an African issue is to first forge a consensus among key African stakeholders and African members of the UNSC (Interview 2 2009). Examples abound of instances in which China reluctantly accepted UNSC actions in part or in their entirety because of the positions taken by key African countries and regional organizations. For instance, China expressed reservations about imposing economic sanctions on Sierra Leone in 1997 but ended up voting in favour of a UNSC resolu-tion because of clear support for the measures from ECOWAS, which had already imposed it own sanctions (Department of Public Information UN 1997; United Nations 1997b , 1997c Teitt 2008) . In recent years, China has been a strong advocate of greater UN involvement in Somalia and of a takeover by the UN of the AU's peacekeeping tasks in that country. China's position in this regard is remarkable given the fact that most other permanent members of the UNSC do not favour the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia. One important factor behind China's position is that the African Peace and Security Council has long pushed for a UN takeover of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the force that has been deployed in Somalia since 2007 (International Crisis Group 2009 . According to Chinese diplomats, China was reluctant to take on the issue but felt compelled to do so since African governments had requested China's assistance due to a lack of interest on the part of other major powers (Lynch 2006) . African support of UN intervention in Somalia was also an important factor in getting China to agree to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force there in the early 1990s (Wheeler 2000: 186; He 2007: 29-30) .
In another instance, in May 2009, the AU took the unprecedented step of requesting that the UNSC impose sanctions on Eritrea, an AU member state, for its alleged support of Islamist insurgents attempting to overthrow Somalia's government. China, which enjoys good relations with Eritrea (AFP 2007; Shinn 2005) , agreed to abstain from voting on a Uganda-sponsored resolution that eventually succeeded in imposing an arms embargo and other sanctions on Eritrea in December 2009. China's ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yesui, expressed his country's reservations about sanctions but also stressed China's appreciation for the AU's efforts to "resolve African issues in an African way" (People' (2011), which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized member states to use "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under direct threat of attack in the country. Before and after the passing of the resolution, China expressed strong reservations about the use of force in international relations (Reuters 2011a ), but its diplomats explained that it had not blocked the action with a negative vote in consideration of the "special situation in Libya" and the wishes of the Arab League, the AU and African countries (Jiang 2011; United Nations 2011) . The reference to the AU was somewhat awkward given the fact that the AU had spoken out against outside military intervention days before the vote in the UNSC. However, all three AU members in the Council voted in favour of Resolution 1973. On the other hand, when a proposed resolution clearly lacks the support of key African leaders and regional organizations, China is more comfortable expressing its opposition to it (Teitt 2008: 16) . For example, in July 2008 China joined Russia in casting a rare double veto against a US-sponsored resolution that sought to impose sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe. Also voting against the resolution was SADCappointed facilitator and regional key player South Africa, which was a non-permanent member of the SC at the time. South Africa's ambassador to the UN, Dumisani Kumalo, explained that his country's vote reflected the positions of the SADC and the AU, which were both promoting dialogue to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe and had decided against taking measures that might negatively impact the climate for dialogue (United Nations 2008a). He called on the UNSC to allow Africa to solve its own problems (New York Times 2008). Chinese statements on Zimbabwe concurred with the view that punitive measures against the Zimbabwean government would be counterproductive. China also expressed support for ongoing SADC and AU mediation initiatives in Zimbabwe, which it felt needed to be given more time to succeed (Liu 2008; United Nations 2008a) .
It is important to point out that while China has been sympathetic to the African position and has often sided with African countries in the SC, it is not keen on taking the lead on behalf of the African continent on sensitive issues. China has generally not been willing to invest political capital or incur heavy diplomatic costs by actively promoting African positions that go against the prevailing opinions of key SC membersparticularly those of Western permanent members. In those cases, China prefers to leave the initiative to others. For example, Pakistan's ambassador to the UN declared in 2006 that China was not as active in opposing Western-sponsored efforts in the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Sudan over the Darfur issue as was commonly assumed but that the initiative actually came from Pakistan and Algeria (Traub 2006) . During the course of 2008 and 2009, China also repeatedly hinted that while it shared African and Arab opposition to the International Criminal Court's (ICC) case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, it believed it would be "more appropriate" if one of the UNSC's African members took the initiative to try to defer the case (Heavens 2009 ).
Deepening Patterns of Engagement as China's Presence in Africa Increases
Since the end of the 1990s China has made significant efforts to upgrade its decades-old ties with the African continent to the level of a so-called "new strategic partnership" (Taylor 2008; Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008) . China turned to Africa in search of energy and mineral resources to fuel its economy, new export markets, and international political support and has been particularly successful at putting its vision of mutually beneficial cooperation into practice. For example, trade between China and Africa increased roughly tenfold between 2000 and 2008, with energy and mineral resources taking up the lion's share of China's imports from Africa (Taylor 2008: 38) . China stepped up its economic cooperation with practically all African countries, but its ties with a number of unstable or conflict-ridden states have attracted particular attention both within Africa and on the international stage. This scrutiny presented China with security and political risks. On the one hand, local movements that perceive China as siding with or assisting the government that they oppose have occasionally targeted Chinese interests and citizens in countries such as Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan (Associated Press 2007; Holslag 2009: 24) . China has thus found out the hard way that its non-interference policy does not prevent it from getting drawn into existing domestic conflicts in African countries (Large 2009 ). On the other hand, internationally, economic cooperation with China is often presented as a lifeline that helps recalcitrant regimes of countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and Guinea avoid having to mend their ways. China has been accused of not using its rising power and influence in Africa to assist international efforts to address African security issues (Eisenman 2005; Harman 2007; Richardson 2006; The Times 2009) .
Calls for China to use its leverage with African governments and to contribute more actively to African peace and development present Beijing with a number of challenges. China is not yet an important player in the global multilateral crisis response architecture, and it is relatively inexperienced when it comes to international conflict resolution (Large 2008 ). China's non-interference policy and its preoccupation with state sovereignty also make many of the solutions that outside powers advocate, such as sanctions or military interventions, in principle unacceptable. Moreover, China takes a state-centric approach in the expansion of its commercial interests in Africa and probably does not wish to com-promise its ties with sitting African governments. As the next section will show, closer cooperation with African regional organizations provides some way out of Beijing's conundrum. China's ties with African regional organizations and the assistance it has provided to their conflict resolution initiatives have become more substantial and pronounced in recent years. By closely aligning its policies with those of key African regional players, China is attempting to respond to international expectations and advance its views on appropriate conflict resolution models while safeguarding its increasing interests in Africa.
African Regional Bodies in China's Security Strategy toward Africa
As noted by a 2008 American report comparing American and Chinese influence in the developing world, China has expanded its ties and the channels for exchange and cooperation with regional organizations in Africa in recent years (Congressional Research Service 2008) . For example, in 2005 China appointed representatives to the AU and SADC after having earlier appointed representatives to ECOWAS and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Xinhua 2006) . China has an established tradition of attending AU summit meetings in an observer capacity while the AU Commission has evolved from being an observer to serving as a full member of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At the launch of its first policy paper on Africa in January 2006, the Chinese government announced plans to step up its cooperation with African regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of peace and security (Xinhua 2006) . Channels for bilateral exchange and consultation between China and the African Union on security issues have subsequently been expanding. Since 2008 China and the AU have been holding annual strategic dialogues, which include exchanges of views on "major international and regional issues of common concern" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2011). The dialogue has alternated each year between being held in Addis Ababa and in China. It complements other multilateral consultation mechanisms such as the Political Consultation launched by Chinese and African foreign ministers at the UN in 2007 to coordinate responses to regional security issues more closely (Huang 2011: 264-265) . In September 2010 the AU Commission was invited to the second edition of this Political Consultation (Ping 2010 ).
In its 2006 Africa policy paper, China promised to provide assistance "within its own capacity" to regional efforts to settle conflicts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2006; Xinhua 2006) . A serious lack of predictable and sustainable funding has hampered the increase in regional institutional capacity in Africa to deal with peace and security issues as well as operations in the field. China's assistance in alleviating these constraints has so far mainly taken the form of logistical and financial support of peacekeeping, with the AU and ECOWAS appearing to have been the main beneficiaries. China has provided aid to the AU's peacekeeping operations in Sudan and Somalia, while ECOWAS has been given grants to help augment its peacekeeping and mediation capacities (Africa Files 2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2004). Apart from providing aid to regional entities, China has also provided military assistance on a bilateral basis to nations that contribute troops to regional peace operations, such as Burundi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda (Shinn 2008; United Nations 2009a) .
What are the characteristics of China's role in African peacekeeping? First, China's aid is not channelled through a fund or programme such as the African Peace Facility of the European Union or the United States' Global Peace Operations Initiative, but is given on a rather ad hoc basis. At times, China's assistance is a reflection of the rise of a certain African issue on China's foreign policy agenda. For example, China made its most substantial donation to the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS) in 2006 when international criticism of China's ties with Sudan and its failure to raise the issue of the Darfur crisis with the Sudanese authorities was getting louder (Shichor 2007) . In early 2009, as the world's attention was focused on the problem of piracy off the Somali coast and as China joined international anti-piracy efforts there, Beijing also started providing financial assistance to AMISOM. Since then, China has repeatedly stated that a fundamental settlement to the Somali piracy issue hinges on the restoration of peace and stability on land. Second, China's financial assistance remains fairly limited. China made its largest donations to regional peacekeeping to date to AMIS and AMISOM. By the time the AU-UN hybrid force took over in Darfur at the beginning of 2008, China had reportedly donated 1.8 million USD to AMIS (He 2008) . However, this amounted to only a fraction of the total budget of AMIS, which was estimated at 466 million USD in 2006, the bulk of which was paid by the US and the EU (Boshoff 2005; De Coning 2007: 12) . With regard to AMISOM, China contributed a total of about 700,000 USD in 2009. This financial support again lagged far behind actual needs -AMISOM's operating costs were estimated at 2 million USD per day (Gill and Huang 2009: 29) -and also behind the support given to AMISOM by Africa's traditional Western donors. The EU, for example, provided 35.5 million EUR from its African Peace Facility to AMISOM during 2008 and 2009 (Franke 2009: 261) . EU statistics reveal that in total the EU had contributed a total of 142.5 million EUR to AMISOM through the Peace Facility as of November 2010. China is reported to have donated 2.2 million USD in cash to AMISOM by the end of 2011 (Xinhua 2011b) .
It is clear that for the time being, China's direct aid to African peacekeeping initiatives remains limited. China's 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid also does not list security cooperation among the major focal areas of China's foreign aid. China's main contributions to peacekeeping on the African continent thus remain channelled through the UN. Its financial support to UN peacekeeping is small compared to Western P-5 countries and Japan (International Crisis Group 2009: 7-8), but it is the biggest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and approximately three-quarters of its troops are deployed in Africa (September 2011 statistics of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). Participation in UN peacekeeping offers China rewards that are not immediately available when providing assistance to regional efforts, such as reimbursements for troop contributions, learning opportunities, the opportunity for Chinese personnel to rise in the UN hierarchy and a non-threatening way to gather military experience and first-hand intelligence in Africa. China participates only in UN peacekeeping missions, not in regional missions or coalitions of the willing. This distinguishes China from Western powers, which, with a few exceptions, have generally withdrawn from active participation in peacekeeping at the UN level. They prefer to focus their energies on conducting their own operations outside of the UN and often perceive their role in resolving African conflicts as confined to providing diplomatic, logistical and financial support of Africa's emerging peace and security architecture (Bellamy and Williams 2009; Olsen 2009; Vines 2010; Williams 2008: 310-312) .
Chinese Levering of the "African Consensus" to Protect Its Increasing Interests in Africa and Reduce Image Costs
China's rising profile in Africa has led to reputational challenges as a result of its ties with a small number of so-called "pariah states" such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. An increasingly important way China attempts to deflect international criticism is by closely aligning its policies with those of the AU or a relevant regional organization and pointing out where its views and those of key African players converge on a conflict issue. China maintains a more conservative interpretation of the right of multilateral security arrangements to get involved in issues of sovereignty than that embedded in, for example, ECOWAS documents and the AU Charter. However, in practice, China's stance on specific issues is very often in agreement with African regional bodies, whose positions are frequently premised on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs (Taylor 2007) . As Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares (2009: 214) remark, in Africa's emerging regional security cooperation, "the reality remains the protection of state security, even if the rhetoric supports human security". An important factor in this is the prevailing political culture among African political elites, which shapes the dominant security culture within African regional organizations more than these organizations' founding documents and charters do (Taylor and Williams 2008: 139-144) .
The socialization of African elites into new norms such as the "nonindifference" principle, which creates a legal basis for the AU to carry out collective interventions in "grave circumstances" such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, is weak (Williams 2007 ). An explanation for this can be found both within states and at the inter-state level. At the domestic level, the dominant political culture in many African states remains one of neopatrimonialism, a system under which personalized authority structured around patron-client relationships coexists with modern bureaucracy (Taylor and Williams 2008) . Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares point out that many African states are struggling with what they term the "African paradox " (2009: 213) . While African states enjoy de jure sovereignty over their territory and population, de facto sovereignty is actually eluding many of them. In their fight for survival and control, political elites resort to the threat and actual use of violence and the disbursement of material benefits to supporters. From this perspective, regional cooperation in Africa should be understood as an effort intended to boost sovereignty rather than to cede it to the regional level. Regional cooperation thus serves mostly as "the pooling of sovereignty, resources and legitimacy in order to preserve regime and state stability" (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 215) . For elites in clientelist and neopatrimonial states, participation in regional interventions sometimes can also serve as a way to acquire patrimonial resources under the cloak of legitimate regional cooperation (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 214) . As remarked by Jeffrey Herbst (2007) , African leaders are thus often only enthusiastic about regional cooperation to the extent that it "highlights sovereignty, helps secure national leaders and asks little in return" (cited in Williams 2008: 320) .
It is important to point out that while many African countries fit the patterns described above, significant differences exist between African countries. For instance, in his analysis of the SADC's security culture between 1992 and 2003, Laurie Nathan discerns two key lines of division among SADC members: one being their approach to regional security, which ranges from pacific to militarist, and the other being their orientation in domestic politics, which ranges from democratic to authoritarian (Nathan 2006: 614-616) . However, even African governments that do not share the same values still tend to act according to the logic of the "politics of solidarity" (Clapham 1996: 106-133 ) that developed during the liberation and post-colonial era. Inter-state relations in Africa remain characterized by a personalization of politics, with African elites often acting in unison to protect fellow incumbent governments from outside pressure or internal adversaries (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 212; Nathan 2006: 616; Williams 2008: 316-319) . The salience of this sense of solidarity can be discerned for instance from the tension that has marked post-Apartheid South African foreign policy, which has oscillated between the promotion of human rights and democracy on the one hand and the politics of solidarity on the other hand. The latter induced South Africa to offer a stringent defence of the sovereignty of weaker states and to promote the idea of applying "African solutions to African problems" on several occasions during its tenure as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007 (Bischoff 2009 Kagwanja 2008; Van Nieuwkerk 2007) .
The lack of common values and the sense of solidarity among African elites mean that the compromise that emerges in African regional arrangements on specific security crises is often the "lowest common denominator" in terms of its impact on the target state's sovereignty. For China, this compromise stance provides a reference point that does not greatly challenge its cherished principles of sovereignty and noninterference. An important discursive strategy for China to deal with the political and reputational challenges it has encountered as an emerging power in Africa is to draw a parallel between its policies and those of key African players. For example, during the height of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008, China repeatedly deflected criticism of its opposition to international sanctions against the country by stating that its policies followed the positions of the SADC and the AU, which were taken as "the consensus of African countries on the current situation" (Li 2008 ; United Nations 2008a). However, this somewhat disregarded the fact that some individual African leaders, such as President Ian Khama of Botswana and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya, held views that were considerably more critical of the Zimbabwean leadership than those of the SADC or AU. These more critical views were the ones that Western countries and analysts often referred to in their criticisms of events in Zimbabwe (Raine 2009: 155-156) . The conflict in Libya in 2011 again revealed China's penchant for referring to the "African consensus" to legitimize its position. Libya provided a rare instance in recent African history in which Western nations got involved militarily in an African conflict under a UN mandate. China felt that the West went beyond the mandate set by the UN Security Council in its interpretation of Resolution 1973 and was among the countries that disagreed with the "Qaddafi must go" policy of NATO, the EU and the Arab League (Barry 2011). As China called for an immediate ceasefire in Libya, it expressed its support for the AU's views and initiatives on the Libyan crisis (Reuters 2011b; Xinhua 2011a) . As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams remark, the Libya crisis raised the question of which views the UNSC should heed in case of conflicting views between different relevant regional organizations. Libya served as a reminder of the potential for Council members to go "forum shopping" in search of views that most suit their own (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 846, 848) . By explicitly backing the AU, China engaged in forum shopping to some extent. One China analyst even asserted that events in Libya showed that "the Arab League is weakening […] while the African Union is in a state of ascendance" (Gao 2011 ). However, China was also careful to avoid the impression of disagreeing outright with the Arab League (Cohen 2011 ).
The utility of providing rhetorical support to regional conflict resolution initiatives for China as an emerging economic power in Africa became particularly prominent during the initial years of the UN's involvement in the conflict in Sudan's Darfur area. When the conflict in Darfur erupted in 2003, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had been investing in Sudan's oil industry for a couple of years already. By 2004 Sudan had become a top energy investment destination for China and the supplier of 4.7 per cent of China's oil. China was also an important supplier of military equipment and technology to Sudan (Large 2007; Shinn 2008) . When the UNSC held its first discussions on Darfur in 2004, it quickly became clear that China did not wish to see the imposition of sanctions on Sudan and sympathized with the Sudanese government's aversion to international involvement in Darfur. In the Council, China referred to ongoing AU mediation and peacekeeping initiatives as a valuable and sufficient alternative for UN action. China stated that AU mediation in Darfur had to be given priority and could only be negatively affected by UN sanctions on Sudan (see e.g. United Nations 2004 Nations , 2005 Nations , 2006a .
China repeatedly declared its support for and appreciation of the efforts of AMIS, the AU's peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The force was overstretched and under-resourced but had been deployed with the consent of the Sudanese government, and hence enjoyed China's support. In March 2005 China endorsed the deployment of a UN mission (UNMIS) to Southern Sudan but did not allow cooperation between UNMIS and AMIS. The Sudanese government had agreed to the deployment of UN troops in Southern Sudan but still opposed UN involvement in Darfur (Holslag 2008: 76) . Increasingly, China was accused of outsourcing conflict resolution in Darfur to the AU as it focused on safeguarding and expanding its economic presence in the whole of Sudan. One analyst called China's 2005 donation of 400,000 USD to the AU's mediation efforts in Sudan, which China itself described as a contribution to peacemaking, a "disconcertingly cynical move" (Tull 2008: 125) . Providing support to the AU's efforts in Darfur came to be seen as a convenient way for China to respond to international calls to alleviate the Darfur crisis, to enhance its image in Africa and to prevent its economic interests in Sudan from being adversely affected by international intervention or sanctions. Ironically, this was in essence not very different from Western powers' use of the mantra "African solutions to African problems", often denounced as an excuse to shirk their responsibilities in Africa (Badescu and Bergholm 2009; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009; Williams 2008: 322) .
While the early years of the Darfur crisis highlighted the benefits that supporting AU initiatives as a substitute for UN action brought to outside powers such as China, they also revealed the limitations of such a strategy: It was only credible for as long as African countries were not advocating greater UN involvement. For quite some time after the AU launched its mission in Darfur in 2004, the conflict was described by many key African leaders as a purely African issue that did not require international intervention (Williams 2008: 310-311, 324) . Logistical and financial difficulties in sustaining its peacekeeping mission in Darfur along with US pressure eventually led the AU to endorse a UN handover of the peacekeeping mission in March 2006 (De Waal 2007 . As more African states began to disapprove of Khartoum's actions in Darfur and contributors to AMIS worried about the safety of their troops, insisting on African self-reliance became an unsustainable position for Beijing. In August 2006 China declared in the Security Council that it was in favour of "replacing AMIS with UN operation", and this "[in accordance with] the African Union's decision" (United Nations 2006b). Darfur thus became one of the more prominent instances of China carefully reading the AU's positions and aligning its policies to those, even if those positions did not necessarily correspond to China's own preferences. From the end of 2006 onwards, China used its diplomatic clout to press Khartoum discretely but decidedly to accept the Annan Plan, which advocated an expanded UN peacekeeping role in Darfur. During his visit to Sudan in February 2007, Hu Jintao proposed a solution for Darfur that envisioned a peacekeeping role for both the AU and the UN. Behind the scenes, China lobbied for Khartoum's acceptance of a new hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping operation (Holslag 2008; Large 2007) . Even though China insisted on Sudanese acceptance of any hybrid peacekeeping force, its policies at the time reflected the preferences of the AU more closely than those of the Sudanese government, which continued to oppose UN involvement (Gill, Morrison, and Huang 2008; Holslag 2008; Lynch 2007) .
Bringing in the West
What influence is China's increased attention to African regional bodies having on Western policies regarding Africa's emerging security architec-ture? As Romain Esmenjaud and Benedikt Franke have pointed out, Western governments have tried to use their support of African regional organizations to shape Africa's security culture according to their own foreign policy priorities -for example, by calling for greater attention to anti-terrorism and human security issues (Esmenjaud and Franke 2009: 24) . Western insistence on human security in particular often sits uneasily with the continuing trend among African elites to prioritize regime security over human security. China is extremely sensitive about Westerninitiated humanitarian initiatives behind which it suspects a regime change agenda lurks, and is deeply sympathetic of Africa's opposition to this (Taylor 2008: 17) . In the UNSC, China often renders diplomatic support to African opposition to Western initiatives that threaten regime security. China no longer dismisses human security concerns outright but states that these can be effectively addressed only in a stable political environment. According to China, sanctions and the removal of key political leaders are detrimental to such stability. For example, China has repeatedly expressed support for the AU and Arab League view that no solution can be found to Darfur in the absence of President al-Bashir and that execution of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC against him in 2009 threatens the peace process and regional stability (Qin 2009; Xinhua 2009 ). In the SC, China repeatedly called on all parties to respect the AU's opposition to the arrest warrant (United Nations 2008b , 2009b .
The outcomes of African regional mediation processes that safeguard the position of ruling elites enjoy considerable legitimacy in China and are likely to receive unconditional diplomatic and material support (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 174-175) . Western donors, on the other hand, express support for African-led mediation initiatives, but are often disappointed with what they perceive as a lack of decisiveness in their outcomes (Williams 2008: 318; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009: 32) . This difference in views resulted, for example, in China being one of the first countries to send a high-level delegation to Zimbabwe and resume aid after the SADC-brokered government of national unity took office in February 2009. During the mediation process, Western governments had on several occasions expressed support for the SADC's efforts. However, they turned out to be highly reluctant to recommence ties with a Zimbabwe still ruled by Robert Mugabe (Grignon 2009 ). However, it is important to point out that signs are emerging that when a government does not have the support of the regional grouping to which it belongs, China is hesitant to at least openly pursue cooperation with it. When Guinea's military rulers revealed in 2009 that they had struck a 7 billion USD mining and oil agreement with the China International Fund (CIF), Beijing was quick to point out that the deal did not concern an official agreement but was struck by merely "an international company registered in Hong Kong" (Ma 2009 ). China had earlier indicated its awareness of international "sensitivities" about business dealings with the military junta and had signalled its intention to heed the views of the AU and ECOWAS on the situation in Guinea, both organizations having suspended the country's membership (Alden 2010) .
Writings by Chinese analysts suggest that China does approach African regional organizations from the perspective of a perceived battle for influence in Africa with the West (Luo 2006: 306-307 ). Jeremy Paltiel has described how China tries to forge a "favourable interpretative community" around sensitive issues such as human rights and sovereignty in order to influence the international consensus around these issues (Paltiel 2008: 205) . Developing countries are often a key target in this effort. Chinese analysts point out the importance of sustained resistance on the part of developing countries and their organizations against Western power politics and attempts to violate developing countries' sovereignty under the pretext of human rights concerns (Luo 2002 (Luo : 34, 2006 . Since much of the UNSC's agenda is concerned with peace and security in Africa, and since both Westphalian and post-Westphalian views coexist in African organizations, these bodies are interesting partners in China's efforts to build a global consensus that is favourable to its position on sovereignty and non-interference. Moreover, with African insistence on the right to solve its own problems, the times seem to be conducive for such efforts. For example, during the time of South Africa's nonpermanent membership in 2007/2008, China cast two vetoes in the SCon Burma and Zimbabwe. On both occasions, South Africa voted with China against the proposed resolutions, arguing that the domestic situations in these countries did not pose a threat to international peace and security and therefore did not warrant UNSC intervention. In his keynote speech during a five-nation tour in Africa in February 2009, Hu Jintao approvingly took the pulse of the continent when he slightly altered China's decades-old phrase of support for African regionalism to state: "China firmly supports the efforts of African countries, the AU and other regional organizations to safeguard state sovereignty and independently resolve African issues" (emphasis added) (Hu 2009 ).
Conclusion
Although China is a permanent member of the SC with a rising profile in Africa and increasing ties with African regional bodies, little attention has been devoted to its views on the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution in Africa. This article fills some of the gaps and also contributes to the literature on how the countries of the "global South", which constitutes a majority in global institutions and is therefore essential to global governance, work together in multilateral settings (Morphet 2004) . Even though China is a major rising power and a formal member of neither the G-77 nor the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it continues to identify strongly with the interests and concerns of the third world. As a proclaimed all-weather partner of Africa, China would probably find it embarrassing to be seen as going against the preferences of African countries. This article has shown, however, that China is also paying attention to regional bodies in Africa and their role in conflict resolution from a more instrumental perspective as an emerging power in Africa. China has increasingly acknowledged and supported the work of regional organizations on security issues that affect its interests in Africa. It occasionally supports regional solutions in conflict situations to enhance its image and protect its economic interests against the backdrop of global competition for African resources. To this end, China has tried to utilize convergences between its own views and those of key African regional bodies. Indeed, China's commitment to working with the AU and other regional bodies can also be understood as part of an effort to promote conflict resolution models that respect sovereignty. African regional organizations are emerging as key forums in defining norms for intervention on their continent. Both Western countries and China are trying to exert influence over the outcome of norm-formulation processes and specific conflict resolution initiatives in Africa. While the West has used its financial aid to shape Africa's regional security infrastructure, China has mostly provided diplomatic support in international forums. African regional organizations still share many of China's views when it comes to issues of sovereignty and non-interference in conflict resolution. China is therefore likely to continue reaching out to these potentially like-minded African partners.
